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Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency 
Robert H. Sitkoff *
Abstract 
In both the publicly-traded corporation and the private donative trust a crucial task is 
to minimize the agency costs that arise from the separation of risk-bearing and manage-
ment. But where the law of corporate governance evolved in the shadow of capital-
market checks on agency costs, trust governance did not. Thus, even more than that of 
close corporations, the law and study of private trusts offers an illuminating counterfac-
tual—a control, as it were—for a playful thought experiment about the importance of 
capital market efficiency to the law and study of public corporations. The animating idea 
for this essay is that many of the differences on the agency costs frontier between the 
public corporation and the private donative trust can be roughly attributed to their relative 
positions in modern capital markets and the related disparity in their residual claimants’ 
ease of exit. Among other things, this approach reveals a correlation between the trust 
law model and the views of corporate law scholars who doubt the ECMH and its implica-
tions for corporate governance. The essay also discusses the use of market data for as-
sessing breach and damages in corporate and trust litigation and for empirical evaluation 
of theoretical scholarly analysis in both fields. More generally, comparison of the gov-
ernance of the public corporation and the private donative trust brings into view the im-
portance of relative price efficiency for the modern approach to corporate governance.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The publicly-traded corporation separates risk-bearing and management.1 Risk-
bearing falls on the residual-claimant shareholders, managerial authority ultimately lies 
with the board of directors. In this regard there is a strong similarity between the pub-
licly-traded corporation and the private donative trust. Donative trusts give managerial 
responsibility for specified property to the trustee(s), but the risk or reward of the trust 
portfolio’s good or bad performance falls on the residual-claimant beneficiaries.2 Thus, 
putting the interests of the trust donor to one side,3 in both the public corporation and the 
donative trust a crucial task is to minimize agency costs by aligning the interests of the 
managers with the interests of the residual claimants. 
At the same time, however, the paradigmatic private donative trust and publicly-
traded corporation operate on opposite sides of the capital markets. In rough terms, the 
corporation is organized to raise (or buy) capital; the modern donative trust sells capital.4 
Thus, where the public corporation is a buyer in capital markets, the modern donative 
trust is a seller. So both the donative trust and the public corporation separate risk-bearing 
and management, but they do so towards opposite ends in the capital markets. An impor-
tant consequence of these differing orientations towards capital markets is the lack of a 
thick secondary market for trust residual claims, the sale of which are also stymied (if not 
altogether blocked) by several doctrinal impediments designed to give effect to the 
settlor’s dead-hand interests.5
 1. Perhaps the most famous statement is ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 2. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=412592 (last visited Sept. 3, 2003). As the Scott treatise puts it, the 
trust “separate[s] the benefits of ownership from the burdens of ownership.” 1 AUSTIN W. SCOTT, SCOTT ON 
TRUSTS § 1 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter SCOTT ON TRUSTS]; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the 
Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295, 315-20 (1988) (discussing “the separation of ownership and 
management” in the trust). The limitation to donative trusts is important because “the settlor in a commercial 
trust almost always retains a residual interest.” Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organiza-
tions: Unraveling the Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 562 (2003). On business trusts, see infra note 15. 
 3. For discussion and references on the “dead hand” in trust law, see Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. 
Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1 (1992); Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand 
and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1254-64 (1985); RONALD CHESTER, 
INHERITANCE, WEALTH AND SOCIETY (1982); Gareth H. Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in 
DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 119 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 18.3, 518-20 (6th ed. 2003). 
 4. John Langbein has broken down trusteeship into three components: administration, distribution, and 
investment. See John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 641, 665-66 (1996). The discussion here focuses on the investment dimension of trusteeship. 
 5. These legal impediments to liquidity, which are related to the often (but hardly exclusively) paternalis-
tic reasons why settlors use the trust to effect a donative transfer, are discussed in the text accompanying infra 
notes 20-24. For further discussion and references on the dead hand, see sources cited in supra note 3; Sitkoff, 
supra note 2, at Part IV.B. & C.2. 
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The animating idea for this essay is that many of the differences on the agency costs 
frontier between the publicly-traded corporation and the private donative trust can be at-
tributed to their opposing, mirror-image positions in modern capital markets and the re-
lated disparity in their residual claimants’ ease of exit. Of course, this involves some ap-
proximation and causation is unlikely to be exclusive. Nevertheless, a number of 
intriguing points about both corporate law and trust law are brought into view by this ap-
proach.6 (Readers familiar with corporate law might wonder why the trust and not the 
close corporation. This question is taken up in Section II.) 
The design for this essay is that of comparison. The essay contrasts the donative 
trust and the publicly-traded corporation with the hope of illuminating the impact of capi-
tal market efficiency, if any, on the evolution of the hypothetical bargain that is in effect 
codified in each.7 More concretely, Section III looks to the law of private donative trusts 
as a counterfactual—a control, as it were—for a playful thought experiment about what 
the agency costs calculus for, and the underlying doctrinal framework of, public corpora-
tions might look like without efficient capital markets. As we shall see, it might well have 
evolved into something that looks more like trust law. This is the means by which this 
essay will revisit The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency.8
The essay is organized as follows. Section II continues the discussion of the reasons 
to compare the donative trust with the public corporation. Unlike the close corporation, 
mutual fund, and partnership, the donative trust matches the relevant characteristics of the 
public corporation—except for its opposite position in the capital markets and its lack of 
an easy exit for the residual claimants. 
Section III then undertakes the comparison along five margins. Each helps to illumi-
nate the importance of market efficiency to corporate governance. A byproduct of the 
comparison is that it reveals a correlation between the views of corporate law scholars 
who have doubts about the validity of the efficient capital markets hypothesis (“ECMH”) 
and the trust law model. The correlation follows from the need for trust governance to 
confront the separation of risk-bearing and management without recourse to the disci-
pline of buy-side capital market participation. Although the correlation does not necessar-
 6. Connecting the two is part of a venerable tradition. See Frederic Maitland, Trust and Corporation, in 3 
H. A. L. FISHER, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 321, 395 (1911) (“And now let 
me once more repeat that the connection between Trust and Corporation is very ancient.”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5(g) & cmt. g (2003) (comparing corporations and trusts); Tatarian v. 
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 672 N.E.2d 997, 1000 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (analogizing the trust to a corpora-
tion). 
 7. The seminal contractarian statement in the literature of trust law is John H. Langbein, The Contrac-
tarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, Contractarian]. See also 
John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). The corpo-
rate law classic remains FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991) [hereinafter EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ES]. 
 8. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 
(1984). The question might therefore be posed as, without i) universally informed trading; ii) professionally 
informed trading; iii) derivatively informed trading; and iv) uninformed trading, how might the law of corpora-
tions have evolved differently? These mechanisms are now staples of finance literature and teaching materials. 
See, e.g., WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE 155 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing Gilson & Kraakman’s 
piece in the context of analyzing market efficiency); JONATHAN R. MACEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN 
FINANCIAL THEORY 59-61 (2d ed. 1998) (same); HOWELL JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR 
LAWYERS 254-58 (2003) (same). 
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ily support the case for moving corporate law closer to the trust law model (it does not 
help resolve the antecedent question of whether the ECMH is indeed a good model of 
reality9), it does further validate the essay’s design
Finally, Section IV explores the potential for capital market price data to provide a 
measure of empirical precision, now routine in the (buy-side) corporate context, for the 
law and study of donative trusts. Empiricism is on the ascendancy in the corporate con-
text in large part because pricing by capital markets provides abundant and widely-
accessible data. The question, then, is whether similar empiricism might be feasible in the 
law and study of capital market sellers such as the donative trust. Among other things, the 
essay discusses the use of market data for assessing breach and damages in surcharge ac-
tions for imprudent portfolio management. 
II. WHY LOOK TO TRUST LAW? 
Before undertaking the comparison of the donative trust and the public corporation, 
it is worth pausing to ask: why the trust and not some other organizational form? Perhaps 
the most intuitive alternative is the close corporation. The close corporation employs pre-
cisely the same organizational form as its publicly-traded cousin, but it does so in the ab-
sence of a thick market for its stock. On this view, the close corporation might be a more 
interesting point of reference for the present endeavor because there are clear governance 
consequences of this absence.10 But in close corporations risk-bearing and management 
are often consolidated in a few owner/managers.11 To the extent this is so, it removes 
from the close corporation the crucial (for present purposes) analogue to the public cor-
poration’s shareholder/manager agency problem.12
In the typical donative trust, however, the shareholder/manager relationship finds an 
analogue in the beneficiary/trustee relationship—only the trust’s residual claimants’ in-
terests, as we shall see in the next section,13 are not alienable in thick capital markets. 
Nor do the trustees serve at the pleasure of the beneficiaries. The combination of these 
factors makes the donative trust the more apposite comparison. The goal here is to assess 
the importance of market-based checks on agency costs when risk-bearing and manage-
 9. The debate over whether capital markets are indeed efficient is ongoing. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The 
Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 (2002); Alon Brav & J.B. 
Heaton, Competing Theories of Financial Anomalies, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 575 (2002); S.P. Kothari, Capital 
Market Research in Accounting, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 105 (2001); Charles M.C. Lee, Market Efficiency and 
Accounting Research, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 233 (2001); Mark Rudenstein, Rational Markets: Yes or No?  The 
Affirmative Case, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 2001, at 15; John Y. Campbell, Asset Pricing at the Millennium, 
55 J. FIN. 1515 (2000); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL 
FINANCE (2000); Eugene Fama, Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioral Finance, 49 J. FIN. 
ECON. 283 (1998). 
 10. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. 
L. REV. 271, 275-77 (1986) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, CC] (explaining the “ways in which the lack of 
an active market for shares can influence investors in closely-held corporations”). 
 11. See id. at 273-74. 
 12. What is more, in practice the parties often contract around the default rules of close corporations to fit 
their particular circumstances. See id. at 281-86. This makes the content of the default rules both less important 
and less representative of the governance of close corporations. 
 13. See text accompanying infra notes 20-24. 
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ment are separated.14 Because it is a seller and not a buyer in the capital markets, and be-
cause the primacy of honoring the settlor’s intent limits the beneficiary’s control rights, 
the donative trust generally lacks such checks. 
Hence mutual funds are also less suitable for the present project, regardless of 
whether they are organized as business trusts or corporations.15 True, like the publicly-
traded corporation and the donative trust, mutual funds separate risk-bearing and man-
agement. But the interests of the mutual fund’s residual claimants are usually alienable in 
a thick market for the fund’s shares. This facilitates market-based checks on agency 
costs. The mutual fund, in other words, is not a closed organizational form. Furthermore, 
mutual funds resist classification as buyers or sellers in the capital markets. They are on 
the buy-side in that their managers must combine good governance with good perform-
ance in order to attract and retain capital. But they are also on the sell-side in that their 
managers’ primary task is to invest the fund’s capital. 
Adding partnerships to the mix,16 the following matrix (Figure 1) summarizes the 
foregoing discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14.  True, beneficiaries of donative trusts do not risk their own capital in the same way that shareholders 
do.  But such beneficiaries, like corporate shareholders, are nevertheless the residual claimants.  They bear the 
agency costs of the donative trust’s separation of risk-bearing and management. 
 15. See generally Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, Corporate Versus Contractual Mutual Funds: An Evaluation 
of Structure and Governance, 69 WASH. L. REV. 927 (1994) (evaluating the comparative merits of the structure 
and governance of the two dominant forms of mutual funds). Non-mutual fund business trusts are likewise ill-
suited to the present project because of the frequency with which they provide transferable or at least redeem-
able interests, less rigorous processes for removing trustees, and voting rights. Together, these characteristics 
make the business trust something of a substitute for the corporation. See generally Wendell Fenton & Eric A. 
Mazie, Delaware Business Trusts, in R. FRANKLIN & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (2003); Schwarcz, supra note 2; Steven L. Schwarcz, Commer-
cial Trusts as Business Organizations: An Invitation to Comparatists, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 321 
(2003); Andrew B. Kopans, The Business Trust in the Mutual Fund Industry: Old Arguments in a New Industry 
with Two New Players (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Journal of Corporation Law); Tamar 
Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as the New Corporate Law, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 325 
(2001); John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE 
L.J. 165, 170-71, 183-85 (1997); Sheldon A. Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered In-
vestment Companies, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 421 (1988). 
 16. See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions, 
14 J. FIN. ECON. 103 (1985). Whether a partnership separates risk-bearing and management depends in part on 
whether it is organized as a general or limited partnership, and its capital market position depends on the nature 
of the partnership business. On the choice between partnerships and corporations, see Larry E. Ribstein, Why 
Corporations?, BERKELEY BUS. L.J. Part II.A. (forthcoming 2004); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Partnerships, in 
3 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 10-13 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Larry E. Rib-
stein, An Applied Theory of Limited Partnerships, 37 EMORY L.J. 835 (1988). 
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Figure 1 
 Donative Trust 
Close 
Corp 
Mutual 
Fund Partners 
Public  
Corp 
Separates  
Risk and   
Management 
yes often no yes sometimes yes 
Residual 
Claim Thick 
Market 
no no yes no yes 
Capital  
Market   
Orientation 
seller buyer seller & buyer unclear buyer 
 
With the exception of the separation of risk-bearing and management, which they 
have in common, the donative trust is the mirror-image of the public corporation. 
III. GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS 
Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose an organizational form that 
separated risk-bearing from management but gave the residual claimants little freedom to 
replace the managers or sell their shares. If at the creation of such an organization you 
were offered a residual stake, what kind of governance arrangements would impact the 
price that you would be willing to pay for it?17 Because these characteristics epitomize 
the donative trust, trust law provides a rough starting point for answering this question. 
The prior paragraph is driving at the idea that, whereas the law of corporate govern-
ance evolved in the shadow of capital-market checks on agency costs, trust governance 
did not. In other words, because publicly-traded corporations are on the buy-side of capi-
tal markets, there is the potential for capital markets, through their pricing of securities, to 
discipline corporate managers.18 Thus, if managers install a weak system of internal gov-
ernance and in so doing expand their opportunities for mal-, mis-, or nonfeasance, then 
the price that investors will be willing to pay for the firm’s securities will fall accord-
ingly.19
But donative trust beneficiaries are awarded their stake in the trust by the donative 
fiat of the settlor, and there is no well-developed aftermarket for the beneficiaries’ inter-
ests.20 Indeed, in many American trusts the beneficiaries are disabled by so-called 
“spendthrift” clauses from alienating (even involuntarily) their interest in the trust.21 
 
 17. The seminal contribution in the agency theory literature on the moment the firm goes public is Mi-
chael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Owner-
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976), reprinted in MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY 51 (1998). 
 18. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980). 
 19. “Prospective minority shareholders will realize that the owner-manager’s interests will diverge some-
what from theirs; hence the price which they will pay for shares will reflect the monitoring costs and the effect 
of the divergence between the manger’s interest and theirs.” Jensen & Meckling, supra note 17, at 58. 
 20. See Sitkoff, supra note 2, at Part III.C. 
 21. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 152-53; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 
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Moreover, trust beneficiaries cannot easily replace the trustees.22 Both of these limits on 
the beneficiaries’ control are designed to give effect to the preferences of the settlor, 
thereby facilitating the donative trust’s often (but not exclusively) paternalistic func-
tion.23 The price of this, however, is that it significantly limits the opportunities for mar-
ket-based checks on trust managerial agency costs. Hence, judicial oversight and the fi-
duciary obligation remain the beneficiaries’ principal recourse. 
Against this, readers familiar with English law might object that it allows for less 
dead-hand control than American law.24 Even so, there is no thick market with reliable 
pricing for beneficial interests in England either. Thus, in English trusts too the fiduciary 
obligation is the principal means of governance. What is more, trustees of both English 
and American trusts are not constrained by an ongoing need to appeal to capital markets 
for financing in the same way that entrepreneurs and corporate managers are so con-
strained.25
Taken together, the foregoing implies that if one has doubts about the ECMH, then 
there is likely to be correlation between traditional Anglo-American trust law and the 
kinds of corporate governance reforms to which one is attracted—stronger fiduciary obli-
gations,26 freer derivative litigation,27 mandatory disclosure,28 and so on.29 There is cor-
58 (2003); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502 (2001) [hereinafter UTC]. A few privileged creditors, however, including 
children, spouses, and former spouses, may sometimes reach the beneficiaries’ interest despite a spendthrift 
clause. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59; UTC § 503. For further discussion and references, see Sit-
koff, supra note 2, at Part IV.C.2; Alan Newman, The Rights of Creditors of Beneficiaries Under the Uniform 
Trust Code: An Examination of the Compromise, 69 TENN. L. REV. 771 (2002); Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking 
the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (2002); Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and 
Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1995); Anne S. Emanuel, Spend-
thrift Trusts: It’s Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REV. 179 (1993); Mary Louise Fellows, Spend-
thrift Trusts: Roots and Relevance for Twenty-First Century Planning, 50 REC. ASS’N BAR N.Y. 140 (1995). 
 22. See John H. Langbein, The Uniform Trust Code: Codification of the Law of Trusts in the United 
States, 15 TR. L. INT’L 66, 75-76 (2001) (noting that the UTC “responds to the concern that under traditional 
law beneficiaries have had little recourse when trustee performance has been indifferent, but not so egregious as 
to be in breach of trust”); JOHN R. PRICE, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING § 10.43.6 at 1165 (2d 
ed. 2000) (noting that “it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the judicial removal of a trustee unless the trus-
tee has engaged in an egregious breach of trust”). There is anecdotal evidence of settlors opting out of trust 
law’s default rules concerning trustee removal. See Sitkoff, supra note 2, at Part IV.B.2. For further discussion 
and references, see Ronald Chester & Sarah Reid Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees Under the Uniform 
Trust Code and Other Current Law: Does a Contractual Lens Help Clarify the Rights of Beneficiaries?, 67 MO. 
L. REV. 241, 253-56 (2002); Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The 
Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697 (2001). 
 23. See, e.g., Fellows, supra note 21; see also sources cited supra note 3. 
 24. The classic authorities are Brandon v. Robinson, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (Ch. 1811); Saunders v. Vautier, 49 
Eng. Rep. 282, Cr. & Ph. (1841); and the Variation of Trusts Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53, § 1 (Eng.). Al-
though English law does not recognize spendthrift trusts, beneficiaries can still be disabled from alienating their 
interests through the use of discretionary and protective trusts. See Sitkoff, supra note 2, at IV.C.2; see gener-
ally GRAHAM MOFFAT, TRUSTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 211-24, 248-73 (3d ed. 1999) (explaining the 
English law). 
 25. Although there may be something of an ex ante competition among professional trustees to attract 
settlors, there is no ex post “market for trust control,” as it were. Cf. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. 
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 661 (6th ed. 2000) (discussing whether beneficiaries should be al-
lowed to change trustees). 
 26. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law’s Duty of 
Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 139-83 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed. 1995); Lawrence E. Mitchell, 
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relation because in the absence of effective market-based checks on managerial agency 
costs the publicly-traded corporation begins to resemble the donative private trust. The 
debate, therefore, is over the premise—whether the ECMH is a good model of reality 
and, accordingly, whether its implications for corporate governance hold.30
A. The Duty of Loyalty 
As a potential residual claimant in the hypothetical organization sketched above, you 
might try to bargain for a more robust duty of loyalty than is ordinarily provided by cor-
porate law. The fiduciary obligation, and in particular the duty of loyalty, is something of 
a crude substitute for active monitoring.31 Applied here, the fiduciary obligation is a 
crude substitute for the mechanisms of market efficiency that cause prices to reflect all 
available information and so underpin the rationality of shareholder passivity in the cor-
porate context.32
Take the application of the duty of loyalty to self-dealing, which is to say deals be-
tween the enterprise and one of its managers acting on his or her own account. The 
Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 475-91 (1993); Paul N. Cox, Reflections on Ex Ante 
Compensation and Diversification of Risk as Fairness Justifications for Limiting Fiduciary Obligations of Cor-
porate Officers, Directors, and Controlling Shareholders, 60 TEMP. L. REV. 47 (1987) [hereinafter Cox, Reflec-
tions]; see generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209 (1995); Tamar 
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983) [hereinafter Frankel, Fiduciary Law]; Deborah A. De-
Mott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of the Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879 (1988). 
 27. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit 
Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1984); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, Shareholder Liti-
gation: Reexamining the Balance Between Litigation Agency Costs and Management Agency Costs (Vand. L. & 
Econ. Working Paper No. 02-10, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=336162 (last visited Sept. 3, 
2003). 
 28. For a sampling of the extensive literature on mandatory disclosure, see Edward Rock, Securities Regu-
lation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 
690 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023 
(2000); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empow-
erment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Prob-
lems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Capital Market Theory, Mandatory Disclo-
sure, and Price Discovery, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 843 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 672 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook 
& Fischel, MD]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure Sys-
tem, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure 
System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983); see also Robert B. Thompson & Hillary Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate 
Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 872-86 (2003). 
 29. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1403 (1985); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1461 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities 
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985). For a historical discussion of the competing approaches to corporate 
law, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989). 
 30. See sources cited supra note 9. 
 31. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit 
Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1114-15, 1118-19 (1988); Sitkoff, supra note 2, at Part IV.D. 
 32. For discussion and references, see Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 520 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 
(1983). 
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agency problem is acute here.33 Corporate law’s answer is a liability rule under which a 
self-dealing manager must show that the transaction was fair. If so, then it will be upheld, 
sometimes even if the manager failed properly to disclose his or her conflict in ad-
vance.34 But self-dealing transactions are often difficult to detect, especially when they 
involve only a few managers who actively cover their tracks.35 Thus, without efficient 
capital markets backing up your monitoring efforts, you might rationally conclude that 
banning all self-dealing transactions is easier than dealing with them on a case-by-case 
basis. Put differently, you might find it easier simply to assume disloyalty from the ap-
pearance of misappropriation36—especially if, as is the case in trust law, the joint value 
to the parties of the prohibited transactions is small.37
This is the trust law approach. Under the no-further-inquiry rule, even if the self-
dealing transaction is objectively fair, the beneficiaries need only show the existence of 
the trustee’s self-interest in order to prevail.38 Once the beneficiaries prove the fact of 
self-dealing, there is “no further inquiry” and the transaction is voided.39 By rendering all 
evidence of intrinsic fairness irrelevant and employing a disgorgement remedy,40 the no-
further-inquiry rule creates a strong incentive for trustees to abstain from self-dealing or 
at least to obtain the ex ante consent of all the beneficiaries.41 The underlying assumption 
is that in the trust law context these deals are so frequently undesirable that the costs of 
 33. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ES, supra note 7, at 103 (noting that “duty-of-loyalty problems often 
involve spectacular, one-shot appropriations, of the ‘take the money and run’ sort”). 
 34. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 366 n.34 (Del. 1993); Marciano v. Nakash, 
535 A.2d 400, 403-05 (Del. 1987); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMICS § 7.2, at 311 
n.8, 315-16 (2002). But see Deborah A. DeMott, The Figure in the Landscape: A Comparative Sketch of Direc-
tors’ Self-Interested Transactions, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243 (1999). 
 35. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, § 7.1, at 306. 
 36. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and 
Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1054-56 (1991). 
 37. “[C]ompliance with the prohibition against self-dealing is ordinarily not burdensome, because the trus-
tee is forbidden only one tiny sliver of the world of investment opportunities, namely, the assets in the trust.” 
Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 7, at 665. In contrast corporate managers “may undertake some self-
interested transactions in order to encourage (by allowing reward) the process of finding new opportunities for 
effectively risk-neutral firms.” Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. 
& ECON. 425, 437 (1993) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, CFD]. 
 38. See Hartman v. Hartle, 122 A. 615 (N.J. Ch. 1923); 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 170.2, at 
320. For discussion and references, see Karen E. Boxx, Of Punctilios and Paybacks: The Duty of Loyalty Under 
the Uniform Trust Code, 67 MO. L. REV. 279 (2002). 
 39. See In re Farrell’s Will, 91 N.Y.S.2d 89, 92 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1949) (citing Albright v. Jefferson County 
Nat’l Bank, 53 N.E.2d 753 (N.Y. 1943)). 
  If a fiduciary places himself in a position where his personal interest may conflict with the inter-
ests of the [beneficiaries], the law stops the inquiry when the relationship is disclosed, and at the in-
stance of the [beneficiaries] a transaction involving self-dealing will be set aside regardless of its 
fairness or unfairness. 
Id. at 757. 
 40. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 36, at 1052; Easterbrook & Fischel, CFD, supra note 37, at 442-
43; see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in 
Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339 (1985) (discussing the limitations, history, uses, and possible extensions 
of the disgorgement principle). 
 41. Even then the deal would also have to pass scrutiny for substantive fairness, so well-counseled fiduci-
aries would seek ex ante judicial instruction. Cf. Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 7, at 666-67 (exploring 
“conflict-tainted” transactions).  
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extirpating the entire class of transaction (a rule) are less than the costs of case-by-case 
adjudication (the fairness standard).42 “These stricter rules substitute for the weaker pri-
vate or market-type constraints,”43 something that was more common in corporate law’s 
treatment of self-dealing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.44
B. The Duty of Care45
Portfolio theory teaches that shareholders can and should diversify. Corporate man-
agers, however, often have considerable firm-specific human capital, and much of their 
financial wealth is likewise often tied up in the firm. So the paradigmatic corporate ar-
rangement is that of risk-neutral (well-diversified) shareholders and risk-averse (poorly-
diversified) managers.46
The donative trust’s mirror-image position in the capital markets reverses this 
alignment of attitudes towards risk. Without a market for trust residual claims, beneficiar-
ies cannot easily diversify; and when one cannot diversify, the standard economic as-
sumption is that of risk-averseness.47 The idea is that the undiversified have a distaste for 
volatility, preferring instead lower expected returns with less risk of a substantial loss—
and this even if the probability that the substantial loss will materialize is relatively small. 
Moreover, because they have no personal wealth tied up in the trust and typically have 
not developed much particular trust-specific human capital, trustees can more easily di-
versify and insure. Given this institutional design, in the absence of the fiduciary obliga-
tion, trustees would be less risk-averse than beneficiaries. That is, they would be less 
averse to volatility. 
These opposite assumptions about the parties’ risk-preferences provide a partial ex-
planation for the differences between duty of care in trust law and corporate law.48 Ab-
 42. On rules and standards see, for example, Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analy-
sis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 
(1988). 
 43. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 31, at 1116; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, CFD, supra note 37, at 
437. 
 44. See Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?: Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. 
LAW. 35, 36-53 (1966) (collecting authority); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, § 7.2, at 308-10; BRATTON, supra 
note 8, at 143-44; JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 10.10, at 206-07 (2d ed. 2003); 
WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS § 9.2.1, at 292-93 (2003); see also Mitchell, supra note 26; Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts 
of Interests: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738 (1978). On the appropriate-
ness of analogizing the fiduciary obligation in one organizational context to another, see Frankel, Fiduciary 
Law, supra note 26, at 804-08. 
 45. This subsection draws on Sitkoff, supra note 2, at Part IV.A; see also A.I. Ogus, The Trust as Govern-
ance Structure, 36 U. TORONTO L.J. 186, 191-92 (1986) (analyzing the duty of care in trust law with reference 
to corporate law). For a complementary approach, see Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: 
Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651 (2002). 
 46. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ES, supra note 7, at 29-30, 99-100. 
 47. See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57, 
60-61 (1989). For general discussion, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 50-53 (4th 
ed. 2003). Behavioral studies, however, are critical of these assumptions. See, e.g., Nicholas Barberis & Ming 
Huang, Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion, and Individual Stock Returns, 56 J. FIN. 1247, 1254 (2001). 
 48. This point is noted in Fischel & Langbein, supra note 31, at 1116, and discussed in Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
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sent conflict of interest or gross negligence, the business judgment rule commands judi-
cial deference to the ordinary business decisions of corporate managers.49 By insulating 
managers from liability in the absence of egregious conduct, the business judgment rule 
helps offset their incentives towards avoiding risk.50 And diversified shareholders do bet-
ter when managers are encouraged to select opportunities with high expected values even 
if doing so involves exposure to a low-probability risk of substantial loss. 
Trust law’s fiduciary duty of care, in contrast, is not similarly buffered.51 Ordinary 
managerial decisions by trustees are reviewed with what is the functional equivalent of 
tort law’s objective reasonable person standard.52 The trustee must “exercise such care 
and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own prop-
erty.”53 This helps offset the structural design whereby trust beneficiaries would other-
wise be more risk-averse than the trust’s managers. In other words, the position of these 
organizations relative to capital markets helps explain the choice of whether internal or 
external diversification is expected. In trust law, the duty of prudence counsels caution, 
and that is what undiversified, risk-averse beneficiaries would prefer. Accordingly, the 
frequent observation that trustees in practice are overly cautious likely reflects some 
combination of too much deterrence from the duty of care and/or a selection effect in the 
initial choice of trustee by the settlor.54
The foregoing analysis also helps explain the corollary obligation of trustees to con-
sider the “risk tolerance” of the trust’s beneficiaries in crafting the trust portfolio.55 
Given the diversity of status of trust beneficiaries (some will be diversified because of 
their other holdings while others will not), this rule requires trustees to tailor their in-
vestment strategies to the beneficiaries’ individual attitudes towards risk. Young scions of 
great wealth can better absorb higher volatility than elderly widows of modest means. So 
a “trust whose main purpose is to support an elderly widow of modest means will have a 
The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52, 94-96 (1987). The 
broader point is that principal-agent relations involve both incentive and risk-sharing problems. For a general 
discussion, see Eisenhardt, supra note 47, at 58. 
 49. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating a gross negligence standard for 
director liability); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, § 6.4; COX & HAZEN, supra note 44, § 10.1. 
 50. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ES, supra note 7, at 93-102; Peter V. Letsou, Implications of Share-
holder Diversification on Corporate Law and Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 179 (2001); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J.); BAINBRIDGE, 
supra note 34, § 6.3, at 259-63. 
 51. Of course, one must be careful about accepting doctrinal labels as conclusive as to whether prudence 
in trust law and business judgment in corporate law beget different outcomes. Still, the different emphases in 
the canonical statements is telling. Although in numerous cases courts have found a breach of the duty of care 
by a trustee, see 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 174, cases holding that a manager of a publicly-traded 
corporation breached the duty of care are almost nonexistent. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, §§ 6.2, 6.4. 
 52. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 1 cmt. (1994); Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 7, at 656. 
See generally Cooter & Freedman, supra note 36, at 1057-59. 
 53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 
cmt. d (2003). 
 54. See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier & James A. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 
1303, 1335 (2003) (stating that “[t]rustees have long been risk averse, conservative investors”). 
 55. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 (1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT 
INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmt. e (1992); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 
27 REAL PROP. PROB & TR. J. 407, 436-37, 444-45 (1992). 
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lower risk tolerance than a trust to accumulate for a young scion of great wealth.”56 Cor-
porate law, in contrast, draws from portfolio theory a paradigmatic shareholder who is 
well-diversified; and anyway, the larger number of residual claimants in publicly-traded 
corporations makes individualized consideration of risk tolerance impractical. 
Note the correspondence between the content of trust law’s fiduciary duty of care 
and the views of reform-minded corporate law scholars who have doubts about the effi-
cacy of market-based checks on corporate agency costs. Reaction to the famous case of 
Smith v. Van Gorkom57 is instructive. Van Gorkom involved review of the Trans Union 
board’s swift acceptance of a merger offer that included a substantial premium over the 
stock’s trading price.58 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held it a breach of the 
duty of care for the board not to have deliberated longer. Notwithstanding the substantial 
premium, the court held that the failure to obtain further information removed the pre-
sumption of regularity granted by the business judgment rule. 
Thus, until it was effectively reversed by statute,59 Van Gorkom more or less pushed 
the duty of care in corporate law closer to the trust law model.60 True believers in the 
ECMH revile the decision. To them, the merger premium was all the information that 
Trans Union’s managers required. Indeed, to some the premium alone justified the 
merger decision.61 In contrast, those dubious of the efficacy of market-based monitoring 
and neoclassical assumptions of rationality applaud Van Gorkom’s more rigorous stan-
dard and emphasis on procedure.62 If one is weary of the ECMH and the cognate teach-
ings of portfolio theory, then one will be less willing to embrace the implications that fol-
low from the assumption of shareholder diversification.63 This is to say that one will 
likely prefer the trust law fiduciary model to corporate law’s reigning market model. 
 56. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(b) cmt. (1994); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 
227(a); see generally Ogus, supra note 45, at 196 (discussing the relation between risk-aversion and trust-
investment law). 
 57. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). For further discussion see Roundtable Discussion: Corporate Governance, 
77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 235 (2001) (transcript of remarks by Robert Pritzker, then Vice-Chancellor Jack Jacobs, 
and three law professors about the decision). 
 58. “[T]he merger price . . . represented a premium of 62% over the average of the high and low prices at 
which Trans Union stock had traded in 1980, a premium of 48% over the last closing price, and a premium of 
39% over the highest price at which the stock . . . had traded any time during the prior six years.” Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d at 869 n.9; see also id. at 875-76. 
 59. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2003). See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the After-
math of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160-61 (1990) (noting the swift legislative overturning of 
Van Gorkom); ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 44, § 8.4.3, at 254-55. 
 60. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 45, at 677. Some have suggested that despite the duty of care lan-
guage in the opinion, Van Gorkom is nonetheless best understood as a change of control case, to which height-
ened duties normally attach. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE 
L.J. 127, 135-40 (1988); ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 44, § 8.4.2, at 253-54, § 13.4, at 513, 518-19. 
 61. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 
1437, 1455 (1985) (calling it “one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law”). 
 62. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. 
Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675 (2002); Hillary Sale, Delaware’s Good 
Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). For further discussion and references, see Charles M. Elson & 
Robert B. Thompson, Van Gorkom’s Legacy: The Limits of Judicially Enforced Constraints and the Promise of 
Proprietary Incentives, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 587-93 (2002). 
 63. See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trus-
tees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996); Cox, Reflections, supra note 26. 
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C. Ex Ante Contracting and Ex Post Settling Up 
The usual corporate managerial function is to deploy the firm’s operating assets in 
accordance with their highest net present value.64 “The only promise that makes sense in 
such an open-ended relation is to work hard and honestly. In other words, the corporate 
contract makes managers the agents of [shareholders] but does not specify the agents’ du-
ties.”65 Viewed in this manner, the fiduciary obligation in corporate law is a second-best 
solution to the optimal contracting problem.66 Instead of getting bogged down in the im-
possibility of specifying conduct ex ante, fiduciary duties supply liability rules that call 
for an “ex post settling up” in accordance with what the parties would have bargained for 
in advance.67
A similar phenomenon is apparent in trust law. The typical settlor today seeks not to 
preserve ancestral land, but rather to ensure the professional management of wealth over 
time (tax exigencies and controlling personalities to one side).68 With the ascendancy of 
the trustee’s managerial function, the fiduciary obligation has eclipsed detailed schedules 
of trustees’ powers as the chief protection for beneficiaries against trustee mis-, mal-, or 
nonfeasance.69 But the differing orientations towards capital markets of the publicly-
traded corporation and the donative trust suggests that ex post settling up is likely to be 
simpler, and so the fiduciary obligation a more effective tool, in trust governance. 
Specifically, managerial decisions regarding financial assets are easier to monitor 
than decisions regarding operating assets. For the latter, observable profits might be good 
or bad as a result of factors unrelated to the performance of the management team. For 
the former, however, market prices for securities are easy to discover and then to com-
pare against market-indexes or other hypothetical portfolios.70 Such a comparison mini-
mizes exogenous noise by in effect netting out secular market trends. This in turn helps 
justify the law’s greater scrutiny of trustees than corporate managers under the duty of 
care—it is simpler (i.e., the balance of decision and error costs is more favorable).71
On similar reasoning there is likely to be greater homogeneity in context across trust 
management than corporate management. Thus, it should be easier for the fiduciary law 
 64. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 93-
150 (6th ed. 2000) (discussing net present value and comparison of alternative investment strategies). 
 65. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ES, supra note 7, at 91. 
 66. This is the contractarian approach to the fiduciary obligation. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, CFD, 
supra note 37; Cooter & Freedman, supra note 36; Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 7, at 656-58; Henry N. 
Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. 
L. REV 1 (1990); see generally Eisenhardt, supra note 47, at 60 (“The focus of the principal-agent literature is 
on determining the optimal contract, behavior versus outcome, between the principal and the agent.”). 
 67. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 
1444-46 (1989); Easterbrook & Fischel, CFD, supra note 37, at 425-26; Gordon, supra note 48, at 92. For a 
critical analysis, see BRATTON, supra note 8, at 149-50. 
 68. This evolution is lucidly detailed in Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 7. 
 69. See Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 7, at 640-43; Sitkoff, supra note 2, at Part I.D.; Gregory S. 
Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 774-75 (2000). Note the 
parallel to the decline of the ultra vires doctrine in corporate law. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ES, supra 
note 7, at 102-03. 
 70. See infra Part IV.A. 
 71. This is consistent with the observation that corporations which perform trust-like functions, chiefly 
financial institutions, receive greater scrutiny in practice. See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 44, §13.4, at 
518 n.17; Frances v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821 & n. 1 (N.J. 1981). 
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of trusts to be more specific in its content ex ante.72 And, in fact, the law of trusts has 
evolved a schedule of detailed fiduciary sub-rules that are responsive to recurring agency 
cost fact patterns.73 Among these sub-rules are the no-further-inquiry rule and the duties 
to keep and control trust property, to enforce claims, to defend actions, to keep trust 
property separate, and to minimize costs (including taxes).74
These sub-rules provide the benefits of rules (as compared to standards) without in-
viting strategic loop-holing by trustees.75 Hence the existence of these sub-rules enhances 
the effectiveness of the fiduciary obligation as a check on managerial agency costs within 
the trust relationship. When aggrieved beneficiaries can squeeze their claim into a spe-
cific sub-rule, their case is simplified. As in the application of any rule, the costs of deci-
sion are lower than for a standard. But when the beneficiaries cannot squeeze their claim 
into a specific sub-rule, the broad standards of care and loyalty serve as a backstop to al-
low for contextual, facts-and-circumstances inquiry into the trustees’ behavior as a part of 
the fiduciary obligation’s ordinary gap-filling role.76
This is not to say that there are no fiduciary sub-rules in corporate law. The corpo-
rate opportunities doctrine is a nice example of one.77 Rather, the point is that sub-rules 
abound in trust law in a way that they do not in corporate law because there is more ho-
mogeneity in agency cost patterns across donative trusts than across public corpora-
tions.78 That is, because there is more variance in the corporate managerial function than 
the trust managerial function, the former is less amenable to ex ante specification than the 
latter.79
Not surprisingly, again there is correlation between the governance of donative pri-
vate trusts and the views of those who doubt the ECMH and its implications for corporate 
governance. The recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for example, establishes a number of spe-
cific rules regarding corporate governance and disclosure.80 The Act, in effect, sets forth 
an ex ante schedule of managerial obligations that concern what in the wake of the Enron 
implosion are thought to be common agency cost patterns across publicly-traded corpora-
 72. The ensuing discussion of sub-rules in trust fiduciary law draws on Sitkoff, supra note 2, at Part IV.D. 
 73. A similar sub-rule phenomenon is apparent in the law of agency and the professional responsibility of 
lawyers. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 380-86, 388-98 (2000) (stating various specific rules); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1–.16 (1983) (stating various specific rules); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101 to 5-107 (1969) (same). 
 74. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 172-85 (1987) (stating various specific duties); UTC 
§§ 801-13 (2003) (same). 
 75. On rules and standards, see supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 76. Langbein, supra note 4, at 657-60; Easterbrook & Fischel, CFD, supra note 37, at 426. 
 77. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, § 7.3; COX & HAZEN, supra note 44, § 11.08. 
 78. True, the sub-rule phenomenon manifests in agency law, too, even though agency covers a broader 
range of relationships than trust law. But the specific sub-rules of agency law, see supra note 73, reflect the sort 
of generic agency cost patterns that are likely to recur in (legal) agency relationships. 
 79. See generally Macey, supra note 2, at 317 (“It is significantly easier to discern whether a trustee has 
reached [the trust’s] objectives than it is to determine whether the officers and directors of a publicly held cor-
poration are doing everything within their power to maximize firm profits.”). On programmability in agency 
relationships, see Eisenhardt, supra note 47, at 62. 
 80. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.) (2002). The substantive provisions of the Act are canvassed in Lawrence A. Cun-
ningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. 
REV. 915, 941-76 (2003). 
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tions.81
D. Disclosure Rules 
Trust beneficiaries are entitled to information reasonably related to their interest in 
enforcing their rights under the trust.82 Trustees who make regular accountings, more-
over, are protected from liability to the extent that the factual basis for any subsequent 
claim was disclosed in an accounting to which the beneficiaries failed seasonably to ob-
ject.83 The former is a stick with which beneficiaries can compel disclosure. The latter is 
a carrot designed to encourage full and regular disclosure. Modern authorities continue 
this approach, and indeed the trend is towards greater disclosure.84
Implicit in the foregoing must be the idea that trust beneficiaries (or their agents 
such as guardians ad litem)85 can effectively digest and then act upon the disclosed in-
formation. Admittedly there is tension between this point and the idea, advanced earlier, 
that the fiduciary obligation is a crude substitute for active monitoring. However, trust 
law’s fiduciary obligation is something of a substitute for monitoring chiefly with respect 
to the prophylactic rules of the duty of loyalty. On the question of prudence, beneficiaries 
(or their agents) should indeed be able to comprehend disclosure by the trustees. As will 
be discussed in greater detail below, the trust portfolio’s level of diversification and its 
overall risk/return tradeoff can be assessed and then evaluated for prudence.86
Corporate disclosure, however, touches not only the efficacy of monitoring by 
shareholders, but also the paradox of capital market efficiency that motivated Gilson and 
Kraakman’s inquiry in the first place.87 The form and nature of disclosure by corporate 
managers manifestly impacts the form and nature of the rivalrous competition for infor-
mation that pushes toward market efficiency. Thus, even Frank Easterbrook and Daniel 
Fischel concede that there are some good grounds for routinized mandatory disclosure.88 
Market checks and direct monitoring by the interested parties might be rough substitutes. 
But this is an area in which the necessary predicate of both appear to collide. 
Accordingly, those weary of the ECMH have two (albeit related) defenses for man-
 81. For discussion and references, see Cunningham, supra note 80; Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regula-
tory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002). See 
generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business 
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002). 
 82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 (1959); 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 173. 
 83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 172 (1959); 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 172; 
UTC § 1005 (2000). 
 84. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust Law at Cen-
tury’s End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1914-15 (2000) [hereinafter Halbach, Trends]; see also Allard v. Pac. Nat’l 
Bank, 663 P.2d 104, 110-11 (Wash. 1983); UTC § 813 (2000); John H. Langbein, The Uniform Trust Code: 
Codification of the Law of Trusts in the United States, 15 TR. L. INT’L 66, 74 (2001). 
 85. This is a problem of agents monitoring agents, which also exists in the corporate context. See, e.g., 
Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 
(1992). On guardians ad litem in the trust law context, see VALERIE J. VOLLMAR ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO 
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 345-46 (2003); Martin D. Begleiter, The Guardian Ad Litem in Estate Proceedings, 20 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 643 (1984). 
 86. See infra Part IV.A. 
 87. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 8. 
 88. Easterbrook & Fischel, MD, supra note 28, at 696-707. For further discussion and references, see 
sources cited supra note 28. 
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datory disclosure in corporate law. One is the usual argument, which again parallels the 
trust law model, that increased disclosure improves the ability of the residual claimants to 
monitor management. The other, however, goes to the core of the ECMH and the mecha-
nisms of market efficiency. If rivalrous competition for information does not in fact cause 
the market to act as if all publicly-available information was immediately available to all, 
then that is a reason for rules designed to ensure that information is promptly and widely 
disseminated. 
E. Litigation Incentives89
When liability rules are the chief check on agency costs, there is a practical limit to 
the number of residual claimants that the organization can effectively support. The 
greater the number, the more serious the collective action dynamic that will weaken the 
incentive to monitor and then to bring litigation.90 Thus, a further lesson of the compari-
son of the donative trust with the publicly-traded corporation is that efficient capital mar-
kets—and the mechanisms that make them efficient—are crucial to the vast number of 
residual claimants who are effectively aggregated by the latter.91
Consider that the paradigmatic shareholder of a publicly-traded corporation has only 
a trivial stake in the company, so he or she has little incentive to reckon the costs and 
benefits of litigation from the perspective of all the shareholders. Indeed, he or she has 
little incentive to monitor management when instead he or she can free-ride on the mar-
ket. Consequently, in corporate fiduciary litigation the real party in interest is often the 
lawyer.92
Litigation incentives are different in the world of donative trusts, however, thanks to 
the (typically) smaller number of residual claimants. Beneficiaries are likely to have a 
nontrivial stake when measured either by the fraction of his or her wealth held in the trust 
or the fractional share of the trust to which he or she is entitled. So fiduciary litigation in 
trust law is more likely than in corporate law to be prompted by the merits. The relatively 
smaller number of residual claimants and their relatively larger stakes lessens the impact 
of the collective action and free-rider dynamics that would otherwise imperil the effec-
tiveness of the fiduciary obligation as a check on trustees.93
 89. This subpart draws on Sitkoff, supra note 2, at Part IV.D. 
 90. See Gordon, supra note 48, at 76-78 (discussing beneficiary free-riding). 
 91. Similar reasoning helps explain concerns about the governance of charitable trusts, for which the bene-
ficiaries are by definition diffuse. See generally Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Chari-
table Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 227; Ronald Chester, Grantor Standing to Enforce Charitable Trans-
fers Under Section 405(C) of the Uniform Trust Code and Related Law: How Important is it and How Extensive 
Should it be?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 611 (2003). 
 92. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ES, supra note 7, at 100-02; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, § 8.3, at 367; 
ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 44, § 10.2, at 351-52, 355-57; see generally John C. Coffee, Understanding 
the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class 
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986). 
 93. It will therefore be interesting to see whether the ongoing relaxation of the rule against perpetuities, on 
which see Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2588 (2003); Stewart E. 
Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2097 (2003); Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends: 
An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000); Angela M. Vallario, Death By A Thousand Cuts: The 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 J. LEGIS. 141 (1999), and the consequent increase in the number of beneficiaries 
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Of course, litigation incentives for trust beneficiaries are not perfect. Some benefici-
aries lack a sufficient stake to reckon the costs and benefits of bringing litigation,94 and 
awards of attorneys’ fees out of the trust corpus to one or both sides in suits over trust 
administration are not uncommon.95 Still, the more modest claim holds. In general, trust 
beneficiaries have better incentives regarding litigation than do the shareholders of pub-
licly-traded corporations. This helps explain why trust law contractarians, such as John 
Langbein, believe that fiduciary litigation has evolved into an effective check on trustees, 
but corporate law contractarians, such as Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, believe 
that corporate fiduciary litigation is often not worthwhile.96
Again there is correlation between the trust law model and the views of scholars 
who have doubts about the ECMH. With Berle and Means being perhaps the best exam-
ple, those who are most worried about the shareholder/manager agency problem specifi-
cally identify diffuse shareholders as an impediment to effective monitoring by the enter-
prise’s “owners.”97 This leads to a different reckoning of the agency costs balance 
between plaintiffs lawyers and the residual claimants on the one hand, and managers and 
the residual claimants on the other.98 And that, in turn, leads to a more charitable view of 
shareholder litigation. 
F. Summary and Extensions 
Both the private donative trust and the publicly-traded corporation separate risk-
bearing and management. But the agency costs calculus relevant to the governance of 
in donative trusts will eventually push trust law towards more of a corporate governance model. See Duke-
minier & Krier, supra note 54, at 1339; cf. Macey, supra note 2, at 319 (noting that in private trust governance 
there is often “a clear residual claimant with strong incentives to monitor the trustee’s performance”). 
 94. See Gordon, supra note 48, at 76-78. 
 95. See, e.g., UTC § 1004 (court may award fees); 3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 188.4 (discussing 
trustees’ authority to pay fees out of the trust corpus); Gordon, supra note 48, at 76-77 n.103 (discussing the 
rules and collecting authority). 
 96. Compare Langbein, supra note 4, at 640-43 (trust law), and Sitkoff, supra note 2, at Part IV.D (trust 
law), with EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ES, supra note 7, at 100-102 (corporate law), Roberta Romano, The 
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991) (corporate law), and Daniel 
R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theo-
retical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1986) (corporate law). 
 97. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1. 
 98. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 27; see also Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder 
Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733 (1994); Coffee, supra note 92; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Un-
faithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1985); 
ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 44, § 10.2, at 355-57. Similarly, arguments in favor of shareholder activism 
often center on the potential for institutional investors who own large blocks of shares—and so perhaps have 
better incentives—to serve as effective monitors and lead class action litigants. This is reflected in both modern 
securities litigation reform, see, e.g., THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.17, at 
397 (4th ed. 2002), and the literature of shareholder activism more generally, see, e.g., Black, supra note 85; 
MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE 
FINANCE (1994); Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism 
of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174 (2001) [hereinafter Romano, Less is More]; Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671 (1995); Edward B. Rock, 
The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991); Roberta 
Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 
(1993); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, § 10.7, at 514-17. 
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each are different. As we have seen, their differing orientations towards capital markets, 
when coupled to trust law’s solicitousness of the preferences of the settlor, reduces the 
viability of market-based governance devices in trust law. Comparing corporate and trust 
governance therefore helps illuminate the importance of efficient markets, and the 
mechanisms that make them efficient, for corporate law. 
Adding rows for incentive-based compensation99 and reputation transmission,100 
both of which are commonly mentioned in the literature of corporate governance as po-
tential checks on agency costs, the following matrix (Figure 2) summarizes the discussion 
of this section. 
 
Figure 2 
 Donative Trust Public Corporation 
Capital Market Orientation seller buyer 
Managerial Function prudently invest maximize value of   
operating assets 
Residual Claimants’ Structural  
Attitude Toward Risk 
risk-averse  
(poor diversification) 
risk-neutral  
(well-diversified) 
Number of Residual Claimants fewer greater 
Managers’ Structural   
Attitude Toward Risk 
risk-neutral or 
 less risk-averse  
(possibly diversified) 
risk-averse  
(poor diversification) 
Legal Institutional Response harder  
fiduciary obligation 
softer  
fiduciary obligation 
Norms Response/Selection Effect cautious managers risk-taking managers 
Incentive Compensation often fixed variable 
Reputation Transmission   low high 
 
IV. MARKET PRICES AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
To say that the donative trust is something of a counterfactual for what the public 
 
 99. Commissions are often set by the trust instrument or by statute at a fixed percentage of the trust’s cor-
pus. See, e.g., N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 2309; Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 7, at 639, 651. There is, 
however, an emerging trend, supported by academics, towards a “reasonableness” standard. See, e.g., Halbach, 
Trends, supra note 84; CAL. PROB. CODE § 15681 (2003); UTC § 708; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 38 
(2003); see generally VOLLMAR ET AL., supra note 85, at 1059-60. Compensation for corporate managers resists 
easy classification because it varies across companies and even within companies across time. It is a fair gener-
alization, however, to say that corporate managerial compensation purports more closely to attempt to align the 
interests of the managers with the interests of the residual claimants. Whether these efforts have in practice been 
successful is unsettled. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the 
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compen-
sation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 
(2000). 
 100. Although professional fiduciaries have reputations that are known to drafters (who then steer clients 
accordingly), reputational information is more robust in the context of publicly-traded corporations. The per-
formance of donative trusts, and hence the performance of the trustees’ investment decisions, are not subject to 
a public disclosure regime. 
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corporation might have looked like in the absence of efficient capital markets is not to 
say that the ECMH has no relevance to trust law. Because the private donative trust is a 
seller in modern capital markets, the ECMH and the antecedent work of Harry Markowitz 
on portfolio selection are indeed quite relevant.101 In fact, since Gilson and Kraakman’s 
observation twenty years ago that the ECMH was then permeating the academic literature 
on trust-investment law,102 modern finance theory has today been assimilated into the 
law itself. Perhaps the clearest indication of this assimilation is that the 1994 Uniform 
Prudent Investor Act, which fully embraces modern portfolio theory and the ECMH,103 
has been adopted in at least 40 states and the District of Columbia.104
Given the empirical precision that market data has provided for the law and study of 
public corporations (on the buy-side), the question for this section is whether such data 
might hold similar potential for the law and study of private donative trusts (on the sell-
side). In particular, the focus here will be on the use of market data for damages calcula-
tions and for empirical scholarship. As we shall see, the potential for empirical analysis is 
another margin on which the buy-/sell-side dichotomy has explanatory traction. 
A. Calculation of Damages 
The notion that market prices might facilitate the reckoning of damages in corporate 
and securities litigation abounds in both the law and the literature. Consider, for example, 
the market exception to corporate law’s appraisal remedy and the use of abnormal returns 
to show the effect of (allegedly) fraudulent statements in securities litigation.105 Of 
 101. See generally Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952); HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, 
PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (1959); see also WILLIAM F. SHARPE, 
PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS (1970). 
 102. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 549 n.1. See, e.g., Harvey E. Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory 
and Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1976). Influential 
early applications to trust-investment law include John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and 
Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1; John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds 
and Trust-Investment Law: II, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1; BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT 
MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE (1986). 
 103. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT (1994); John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and 
the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 665-66 (1996); see also Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust In-
vestment Law in the Third Restatement, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 407 (1992) [hereinafter Halbach, TIL]; 
John H. Langbein, The New American Trust-Investment Act, 8 TR. L. INT’L 123 (1994); REVISED UNIF. 
PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT (1997); Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New 
Millennium, or, We Don’t Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 567-71 (1998); Joel C. 
Dobris, New Forms of Private Trusts for the Twenty-First Century—Principal and Income, 31 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1996). 
 104. See The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About the Uni-
form Prudent Investor Act, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upria.asp (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2003); see also Lyman W. Welch, Brave New World of Total Return Laws, TR. & EST., June 
2002, at 24 (June 2002) (examining the differences between the states’ total return legislation). England adopted 
similar rules in 2000. See, e.g., PENELOPE REED & RICHARD WILSON, THE TRUSTEE ACT 2000: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE (2001). 
 105. See generally William T. Allen, Securities Markets as Social Products: The Pretty Efficient Capital 
Market Hypothesis, 28 J. CORP. L. 551 (2003); Daniel R. Fischel, Market Evidence in Corporate Law, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 941, 961 (2002); Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in 
Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1 (1995); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ES, supra note 7, at 145-61; Hideki Kanda 
& Saul Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429 (1985); 
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course, the appropriateness of recourse to market data in these contexts boils down to the 
question of whether market prices are reliable, meaning at least relative price efficiency. 
Though on this issue there is ongoing debate,106 for present purposes it is enough to note 
that the ready availability of market data offers the potential for simplified and more ac-
curate damages analyses in corporate and securities litigation. 
So what of damages in trust law? Because the core managerial function of trustees is 
prudently to invest the trust’s assets (i.e., to sell capital), market data might be useful for 
ascertaining both breach and damages in surcharge actions for imprudence—breach and 
damages being separate, albeit related, questions. 
On the question of breach, which is the initial question in these cases, it is now well 
understood that trustees are no longer constrained by antiquated notions of speculation 
and court-approved lists of appropriate investments.107 Going forward, this idea in prac-
tice should involve assessing the tightness of fit between the portfolio’s design and the 
risk-tolerance of the trust’s beneficiaries.108
On the question of remedy, which arises only after the fact of a breach has been 
shown, so-called “total return damages” is what the future holds. This means the use of 
historical data to model how a proper portfolio would have performed and then a com-
parison of this hypothetical against the actual portfolio’s performance. As Edward Hal-
bach explained with reference to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts (with which the 1994 
Uniform Prudent Investor Act is consistent): 
Unlike traditional policy, the Restatement Third generally measures a trustee’s 
liability for improper investment conduct by reference to total return, positive 
or negative. Thus, in most situations, the new restatement allows the recovery 
through surcharge actions to be increased or decreased to reflect the gains and 
losses in value that reasonably should have been expected from an appropriate 
investment program. A major objective of the new rule is to assure that trustees 
who have ignored important aspects of their fiduciary obligations by employing 
inadequate investment strategies will not be insulated from liability merely be-
cause their investment programs escaped loss of dollar value during periods of 
significantly rising markets, from which their trust estates should have but did 
not benefit.109
Market data, in other words, offers the potential for more closely aligning awards of 
damages for imprudence with the underlying remedial aim of traditional doctrine, which 
resembles that of the familiar expectations measure from contract law,110 of putting the 
Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securi-
ties, 38 BUS. LAW. 1 (1982). 
 106. For discussion and references, see sources cited in supra note 9. 
 107. See sources cited supra note 103. See also Joel C. Dobris, Speculations on the Idea of “Speculation” in 
Trust Investing: An Essay (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Journal of Corporation Law). 
 108. For discussion of relevant considerations, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR 
RULE § 227 cmt. k (1992). Cf. MACEY, supra note 8, at 80-84 (discussing econometric techniques for evaluat-
ing portfolio risk and return). The temporal perspective is the time at which the decision was or should have 
been made. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENTIAL INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmt. b (1992). 
 109. Halbach, TIL, supra note 103, at 458-59; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT 
INVESTOR RULE Reporter’s Notes to §§ 205, 208-11 (1992). 
 110. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 12.1, 12.8 (3d ed. 1999). 
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beneficiaries in the position that they would have been in but for the trustee’s imprudence 
(the “make-whole” standard).111 Make-whole has long been the standard for relief in 
trust law;112 what the market-based approach to total return damages sketched here adds 
is a means more accurately to “restore the values of the trust estate and trust distributions 
to what they would have been if the trust had been properly administered.”113
In opposition it is sometimes suggested that the market-based, total return approach 
is too speculative or too difficult for courts to administer.114 The recent and influential 
decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Estate of Janes is illustrative.115 Even 
though the court embraced a portfolio theory mode of analysis on the question of 
breach,116 it nonetheless rejected a total return measure of damages in favor of “capital 
lost” plus interest at the discretion of the trial court.117 The logic behind the court’s rea-
soning is obscure. A total return measure would hardly have been speculative or difficult 
to calculate. Indeed, total return damages would have been both simpler and more consis-
tent with the make-whole standard than “capital lost” plus discretionary interest. 
The more general point is that the evolution of modern finance theory and the abun-
dance of easily accessible market data should make the process of calculating total return 
damages straightforward. All that will be required in the typical case is a backward look-
ing comparison of the trust’s actual performance with that of a prudent hypothetical port-
 111. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 205 (1992); UTC § 1002(a)(1); 
see also GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 701, at 198 (rev. 
2d ed. 1982); Halbach, TIL, supra note 103, at 460. 
 112. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a (1959) (explaining that the beneficiary 
may pursue “a remedy which will put him in the position in which he would have been if the trustee had not 
committed the breach of trust”); 3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 2, § 205, at 237 (“The beneficiaries are enti-
tled to be put in the position that they would have occupied if no breach of trust had been committed.”); sources 
cited supra note 111; see generally John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme 
Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003) (discussing trust 
law’s make-whole standard in the context of its application to ERISA litigation). 
 113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 205 (1992). 
 114. See, e.g., Williams v. J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 320, 332-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting 
as “speculative” a damages measure based on “hypothetically” invested assets); Williams v. J.P. Morgan & Co., 
Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); Matter of Kellog’s Trust, 230 N.Y.S.2d 836, 847-48 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962); Halbach, TIL, supra note 103, at 459-60 (collecting illustrative authority); C. Boone 
Schwartzel, Is the Prudent Investor Rule Good for Texas?, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 701, 813-814 (2002); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE Reporter’s Notes to §§ 205, 208-11 (1992); cf. 
Richard V. Wellman, Punitive Surcharges Against Disloyal Fiduciaries—Is Rothko Right?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 
95 (1978) (arguing against instituting “appreciation damages”). 
 115. 681 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1997). See JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS 1061-68 (2d ed. 
2003); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 1334-45 (3d ed. 2002); ROGER W. 
ANDERSEN & IRA MARK BLOOM, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES 521-26, 580-81 (2d ed. 2002); 
ELIAS CLARK ET AL., GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 691-99 (4th ed. 1999); see also EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., 
DECEDENTS’ ESTATES AND TRUSTS 902, 971 (6th ed. 2000). 
 116. Janes, 681 N.E.2d at 335-39. For discussion of this point, see Martin D. Begleiter, Does the Prudent 
Investor Need the Prudent Investor Act—An Empirical Study of Trust Investment Practices, 51 ME. L. REV. 28, 
70-71 (1999). 
 117. Janes, 681 N.E.2d at 339-40 (rejecting a “lost profits” measure of damages). Because it was decided 
under the prudent investor standards in existence before the new Uniform Act and Restatement Third, see id. at 
336 n.*, there is hope that the opinion’s approach to damages will not be followed in cases that will be decided 
under the modern law of trust investment. In New York this would be “investments ‘made or held’ by a trustee 
on or after January 1, 1995.” Id. 
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folio, one that would have satisfied the initial breach analysis.118 Hence, in most cases 
there will likely be little need to trundle out the high-powered tools of modern financial 
economics. 
True, there will be some uncertainty if more than one hypothetical portfolio would 
have been prudent. But this residual uncertainty is the fault of the trustee who opted for 
an imprudent portfolio design in the face of by hypothesis multiple prudent alternatives. 
And it is a venerable principle of the law of remedies that “reasonable doubts as to rem-
edy ought to be resolved against the wrongdoer.”119 Here the “wrongdoer” is the trustee 
who has been shown to have crafted an imprudent portfolio and hence to have caused the 
uncertainty in the first place. 
The courts’ experience with market-based measures of making beneficiaries whole 
in pension litigation, upon which ERISA imposes a trust law paradigm,120 is instructive. 
As the leading case of Donovan v. Bierwirth121 explained, when restoring “the trust bene-
ficiaries to the position they would have occupied but for the breach of trust,” the trial 
court 
should presume that the funds would have been treated like other funds being 
invested during the same period in proper transactions. Where several alterna-
tive investment strategies were equally plausible, the court should presume that 
the funds would have been used in the most profitable of these. The burden of 
proving that the funds would have earned less than that amount is on the fidu-
ciaries found to be in breach of their duty. Any doubt or ambiguity should be 
resolved against them.122
Once a prudent hypothetical portfolio has been selected, there is nothing speculative 
or impractical in the calculation of how it would have performed over a past period. One 
need only collect the historical data, weight the performance of each constituent asset in 
accordance with its relation to the composition of the hypothetical portfolio as a whole, 
and then adjust for taxes and other expenses that would have been incurred. In this sense 
the analogy to expectation damages in contract law is arresting. There, too, damages must 
 118. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Such a portfolio might, but need not, correspond to a well-
known index. See MACEY, supra note 8, at 82; see also Dominic J. Campisi & Patrick J. Collins, Index Returns 
As A Measure of Damages in Fiduciary Surcharge Cases, TR. &. EST., June 2001, at 18; Halbach, TIL, supra 
note 103, at 461. 
 119. Jones Motor Co. v. Holtkamp, Liese, Beckemeier & Childress, P.C., 197 F.3d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 
1999); see, e.g., Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931) (“The wrong-
doer is not entitled to complain that [damages] cannot be measured with the exactness and precision that would 
be possible if the case, which he alone is responsible for making, were otherwise.”); U.S. Naval Inst. v. Charter 
Communications, Inc., 936 F.2d 692, 697 (2d Cir. 1991) (same point); see also Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange 
504, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722). 
 120. See ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103; Langbein, supra note 112, at Part I.A-B; JOHN H. LANGBEIN & 
BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 646-48 (3d ed. 2000). 
 121. 754 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 122. Id. at 1056-57. The court continued, this “is nothing more than application of the principle that, once a 
breach of trust is established, uncertainties in fixing damages will be resolved against the wrongdoer.” Id. Addi-
tional illustrative cases involving both ERISA plans and traditional private trusts are collected at Halbach, TIL, 
supra note 103, at 461-62; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE Reporter’s Notes to 
§§ 205, 208-11 (1992). 
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be proved with reasonable certainty.123 And there, too, modern financial sophistication 
has rendered what might formerly have been speculative or impractical now routine.124
B. Empirical Scholarship 
In trying to get a handle on the agency costs load borne by the beneficiaries of dona-
tive trusts, one is struck by the unempirical (which is not to say unhelpful) way in which 
trust scholarship proceeds. Existing commentary is for the most part theoretical.125 Thus, 
if one wants to know if fiduciary litigation works; or if one wants to know the welfare 
effects of midstream modifications to the deal; or if one wants to know the welfare con-
sequences of jurisdictional competition, then one’s inquiry will likely be anecdotal, quali-
tative, comparative (American and English trust law have nontrivial differences), and 
hopefully in the future more rigorously empirical in a sociologist’s sense—surveys and 
data sets built with proper sampling techniques.126 Given the absence of price feedback 
in trust governance, this may be the best for which we can hope. 
Contrast this limited aspiration with the highly empirical trend in the modern litera-
ture of corporate law.127 Is fiduciary litigation and the derivative suit any good? Empiri-
cal studies are too numerous to count.128 Is jurisdictional competition and Delaware’s 
hegemony good or bad? Empirical analyses abound.129 These theoretical questions have 
 123. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 110, § 12.15, at 830; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 
(1981); Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 624 N.E.2d 1007 (N.Y. 1993). 
 124. A recent example is Mindgames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., Inc., 218 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2000). In rejecting 
the so-called “new business rule” in favor of the ordinary “reasonable certainty” test, Chief Judge Posner ex-
plained: 
The rule may have made sense at one time; the reduction in decision costs and uncertainty brought 
about by avoiding a speculative mire may have swamped the increased social costs resulting from 
the systematically inadequate damages that a “new business” rule decrees. But today the courts 
have become sufficiently sophisticated in analyzing lost-earnings claims, and have accumulated 
sufficient precedent on the standard of undue speculativeness in damages awards, to make the bal-
ance of costs and benefits tip against the rule. 
Id. at 658; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 110, § 12.15, at 833-34; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 352 cmt. b (1981) (noting the appropriateness of expert testimony and economic and financial data). 
 125. A nice example is my own. See Sitkoff, supra note 2. 
 126. See, e.g., Begleiter, supra note 116, at 72-85 (surveying corporate trustees to evaluate the impact of 
trust-investment law reform); Gordon, supra note 48, at 76 n.99 (collecting survey-based studies); see also 
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 503-07 (discussing the utility of survey data). For discussion of the assimila-
tion of interdisciplinary and empirical approaches into legal scholarship, see Shari Seidman Diamond, Empiri-
cal Marine Life in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins, and Plankton, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 803. 
 127. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I: Technique and Corpo-
rate Litigation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141 (2002); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the 
Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380 (2002). Even today’s theoreti-
cal work makes use of the empirical analyses of others. My prior work again supplies an example. See Robert 
H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1141, 1150-51 (2002) (referring to empirical studies in support of a theoretical argument). 
 128. See, e.g., Romano, Less is More, supra note 98; Thompson & Thomas, supra note 27; see also Fischel 
& Bradley, supra note 96. 
 129. See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcom-
ing 2004); Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 1775 (2002); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001); 
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 
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analogues in the study of trust law, but as yet they have not been studied in a rigorously 
empirical way. The chief explanation is that empirical work in the corporate context is 
simplified by the abundance of readily available market data and the assumption of rela-
tive price efficiency. Together, these factors make it feasible rigorously to test theoretical 
predictions. 
This is not to say that corporate empiricism is easy. Rather it is to say that, if one ac-
cepts that the mechanisms of market efficiency are working at least well enough so that 
prices are efficient in a relative sense, then one has a means to rapid and sharp analysis of 
important policy questions—the market’s price feedback. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In order to assess the importance of understanding the mechanisms of market effi-
ciency—and hence to revisit the contribution of Gilson and Kraakman’s The Mechanisms 
of Market Efficiency130—this essay looked to the law of private donative trusts for inspi-
ration about what the law and study of public corporations might look like without effi-
cient capital markets. The donative trust supplies something of a control for such a 
thought experiment, because it matches the relevant characteristics of the public corpora-
tion, chiefly the separation of risk-bearing and management. Only it separates risk-
bearing and management toward an opposite end in the capital markets (it is a seller, not 
a buyer), and it does so without an effective exit option for its residual claimants. Among 
other things, this approach reveals a correlation between the trust law model and the 
views of corporate law scholars who doubt the ECMH and its implications for corporate 
governance. The essay also discussed the use of market data for assessing breach and 
damages in corporate and trust litigation and for empirical evaluation of theoretical 
scholarly analysis in both fields. More generally, comparison of the governance of the 
public corporation and the private donative trust brings into view the importance of rela-
tive price efficiency for the modern approach to corporate governance. 
 
(1985). 
 130. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 8. 
